Media, Technology and Society

Nuclear Weapons and Heidegger's Ontological Approach to Technology

"The instrumental conception of technology conditions every attempt to bring man into the right relation to technology....The will to mastery becomes all the more urgent the more technology threatens to slip from human control." (Hubert L. Dreyfus quotes Heidigger in Heidigger on Technology)

What is the "right" relation to technology? A relation where technology can be conceived of as an "instrument", a "tool" and nothing more? The will and capacity for humanity to exercise mastery of technology is implied seemingly, in this idea of the right relation to technology. I like the idea of attempts to gain mastery becoming more "urgent" as it becomes clear that technology has some deterministic aspects.

To invoke an oft-used example, the atom bomb is one technology, which once released, is difficult to control or subvert to any kind of mastery. Once invented it can't be un-invented, or voluntarily relinguished to use Langdon Winners term. Oppenheimer's lament over the release of the atom bomb in the late 1940s is a good example perhaps of this peculiarly modern desperation concerning the lack of generalized human control over a particularly dangerous technology.

In some ways, "mastery" as it concerns nuclear weapons has been attempted historically through efforts to build the largest world-wide arsenal, as opposed to non-proliferation agreements. Both are (desperate) attempts to gain control over this technology and exercise influence over the context of its use or non-use.

Disciplining Technology: Extracting the Benefits for Democracy and Marginalized Groups

Although it is difficult to arrive at singular themes among the diverse literature of writings on technology, there is one prevailing theme among some readings which fall somewhere between technological determinism and social advocacy. In advocating for technological leadership in the African American community, businessman and writer Timothy L. Jenkins stresses that without an active struggle to gain the benefits of technological progress, they will suffer “systematic exclusion” (120). In his article on technological politics and democracy, Richard Sclove arrives at several criteria that new technologies must satisfy in order to avoid weakening the sense of democratic power that localized groups of people have over their everyday affairs. Many other writers in this tradition such as Wade Rowland and Ziauddin Sardar write of persistently commercial or westernized control over the course of technological progress, and yet neither incriminates technology in principle. Instead they arrive at a set of explanations for why technology developed the way it has, explanations for its insufficiency, and recommendations for the future – usually involving a plea for democratic participation in ‘guiding’ the course of technological evolution.

There are two implicit premises to the view of these writers. The first is that technology is better guided than opposed altogether. Writing of the capacity of the internet to increase burdensome high tech requirements and produce job losses for those without the right training, Jenkins nevertheless advocates that the black community should take control of its technological future.

“Because we share a stake in the design of the future, we must exercise the option to modify these outcomes based on direct participation in the decision making processes that are bringing about the construction of the new information superhighway” (124).

Sclove in writing of the importance of local, democratic control over technology, provides several examples of why control over technology and development has been removed from the local scale (irresponsible municipal governments, importance of efficiency and convenience over other concerns) and emphasizes that technology must not threaten the political mobilization of its users. Nevertheless, Sclove provides examples of what successful democratic technologies look like, and how they can be tested and developed.

The second premise expands on the first premise in arguing that when it is guided, technology has the capacity to redress the grievances of undemocratic or malignant technology. For example, in fostering a democratic sense of community, Sclove cites the example of Swedish neighbourhoods that refashioned a “system of purely private yards into a well-balanced blend of private, semipublic and public spaces”. Sclove emphasizes that this local solution requires and empowers the local citizen, but it is also a technological solution which redresses the insufficiency of earlier technological solution. Likewise, Jenkins emphasizes the radical uses and roles of information technology when used by ‘gatecrashers’:

“all of this means that traditional leadership talents must now be enhanced by additional technology training and exposure…with which to influence public policy as well as manage community institutions” (131).

Ziauddin Sardar in arguing for a more heterogeneous, non-western and ‘open’ discussion in the discipline of futures studies, also outlines a new role for technology in the hands of eastern economic powers and their philosophers. Sardar argues that the Asian economic powers must attain self sufficiency in trade, create their own technologies and non-Western understandings of it, and expand culturally. In doing so, new thinking in futures studies and in the uses and applications of technology will be attained when Asia “..starts to think afresh by marginalizing the West” (118). Although Sardar is clearly more concerned about the separation of Western domination from global discourses of technology and the future, he nevertheless implies that Asian economic and technological expansion are the underlying sources of this scenario.

Finally, although I am committing a crude generalization, these writers could be said to advocate technological solutions to redress past technological imbalances. They are thus optimists in the same vein as Weinberg, who proposes that technology be recruited reflexively to solve not only initial problems, but the problems arising from the technological fixes to the those initial problem. In general, we arrive at the “fix for a fix” scenario, in which evolution is never complete, but constantly strives for a perfect system. For Jenkins, this perfect system, would be one where technology is designed for and used by the black community without any discrimination or exclusion. Sclove’s ideal fix is one where technology is designed, put on trial and (if successful) implemented at the local level on behalf of local constituencies. Although Sardar resorts to extremes, his technological fix involves the creation and discussion of technology on wholly Eastern terms. To me these writers envision a much more natural and evolutionary parallel than the reductionist positions of some anti-technologists who view all effects of technology as negative, and propose its removal altogether.

Disciplining Technology: Extracting the Benefits for Democracy and Marginalized Groups

Disciplining Technology: Extracting the Benefits for Democracy and Marginalized Groups

By Peter Konefal

Although it is difficult to arrive at singular themes among the diverse literature of writings on technology, there is one prevailing theme among some readings which fall somewhere between technological determinism and social advocacy. In advocating for technological leadership in the African American community, businessman and writer Timothy L. Jenkins stresses that without an active struggle to gain the benefits of technological progress, they will suffer “systematic exclusion” (120). In his article on technological politics and democracy, Richard Sclove arrives at several criteria that new technologies must satisfy in order to avoid weakening the sense of democratic power that localized groups of people have over their everyday affairs. Many other writers in this tradition such as Wade Rowland and Ziauddin Sardar write of persistently commercial or westernized control over the course of technological progress, and yet neither incriminates technology in principle. Instead they arrive at a set of explanations for why technology developed the way it has, reasons for its insufficiency, and recommendations for the future – usually involving a plea for democratic participation in ‘guiding’ the course of technological evolution.

There are two implicit premises to the view of these writers. The first is that technology is better guided than opposed altogether. Writing of the capacity of the internet to increase burdensome high tech requirements and produce job losses for those without the right training, Jenkins nevertheless advocates that the black community should take control of its technological future.

“Because we share a stake in the design of the future, we must exercise the option to modify these outcomes based on direct participation in the decision making processes that are bringing about the construction of the new information superhighway” (124).

Sclove in writing of the importance of local, democratic control over technology, provides several examples of why control over technology and development has been removed from the local scale (irresponsible municipal governments, importance of efficiency and convenience over other concerns) and emphasizes that technology must not threaten the political mobilization of its users. Nevertheless, Sclove provides examples of what successful democratic technologies look like, and how they can be tested and developed.

The second premise expands on the first premise in arguing that when it is guided, technology has the capacity to redress the grievances of undemocratic or malignant technology. For example, in fostering a democratic sense of community, Sclove cites the example of Swedish neighbourhoods that refashioned a “system of purely private yards into a well-balanced blend of private, semipublic and public spaces”. Sclove emphasizes that this local solution requires and empowers the local citizen, but it is also a technological solution which redresses the insufficiency of earlier technological solution. Likewise, Jenkins emphasizes the radical uses and roles of information technology when used by ‘gatecrashers’:

“all of this means that traditional leadership talents must now be enhanced by additional technology training and exposure…with which to influence public policy as well as manage community institutions” (131).

Ziauddin Sardar in arguing for a more heterogeneous, non-western and ‘open’ discussion in the discipline of futures studies, also outlines a new role for technology in the hands of eastern economic powers and their philosophers. Sardar argues that the Asian economic powers must attain self sufficiency in trade, create their own technologies and non-Western understandings of it, and expand culturally. In doing so, new thinking in futures studies and in the uses and applications of technology will be attained when Asia “..starts to think afresh by marginalizing the West” (118). Although Sardar is clearly more concerned about the separation of Western domination from global discourses of technology and the future, he nevertheless implies that Asian economic and technological expansion are the underlying sources of this scenario.

Finally, although I am committing a crude generalization, these writers could be said to advocate technological solutions to redress past technological imbalances. They are thus optimists in the same vein as Alvin Weinberg, who proposes that technology be recruited reflexively to solve not only an initial problem, but the problems arising from the technological fixes to that initial problem. In general, we arrive at the “fix for a fix” scenario, in which technological evolution is never complete, but constantly pursues perfection. For Jenkins, this perfect system is one where technology is designed for and used by the black community without discrimination or exclusion. Sclove’s ideal fix is one where technology is designed, put on trial and (if successful) implemented at the local level on behalf of local constituencies. Although Sardar resorts to extremes, his technological fix involves the production of technology and its discourses on wholly Eastern terms. It appears that these writers envision a much more natural and evolutionary parallel than the reductionist positions of some anti-technologists (Postman et al) who view all effects of technology as negative, and propose its rejection altogether.

References:

Teich, Albert H. “Technology and the Future” 9th Ed.

Individual References:

Jenkins, Timothy L. "Black Futurists in the Information Age"

Postman, Neil "Amusing Ourselves to Death" Penguin Books, 1985

Sardar, Ziauddin "Western Colonization of the Future"

Sclove, Richard "Technological Politics as if Democracy Really Mattered"